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Abstract 
We introduce strategists to the Mindspace framework and explore its applications in strategic 
contexts. This framework consists of nine effective behavioral interventions which are 
grounded in the public policy applications, and focuses on how changing the context can be 
more effective than attempts to de-bias decision-makers. Behavioral changes are likely when 
we follow rather than fight human nature. Better decisions can be achieved by engineering 
choice contexts to “engage a bias” to overcome a more damaging bias. We illustrate how to 
engineer strategic contexts through two case studies and outline directions and challenges 
when applying Mindspace to strategic decisions. 
 
Keywords: decision biases, Mindspace, choice architecture, strategy 
 







 Good decisions are central to effective strategizing. Yet decades of research show that 
managers are subject to systematic biases that can lead to costly errors.1,2 The question is: are 
these biases fixable?  
 Conventional approaches to eliminating biases focus on changing the mind of the 
decision-maker. If people can be trained to recognize their biases, thereby gaining the ability 
to think more logically, carefully and to more closely approximate the fabled rational 
decision-maker, better outcomes are more likely.3,4 This implies that good decisions require 
managers to be “de-biased”, possibly through education or training.  
 We introduce strategists to an alternative framework for managing decision biases by 
changing the contexts – the “Mindspace” framework.5,6 Mindspace is the mnemonic of nine 
contextual forces that can significantly shape our behaviors: Messengers, Incentives, Norms, 
Defaults, Salience, Prime, Affect, Commitment and Ego. Conventional de-biasing aims to 
make existing decision making strategies more accurate, whereas Mindspace helps reframe 
the decision so that different contextual forces can be employed to induce behavioral 
changes. In a nutshell, to combat a known bias, the Mindspace approach engages System 1 
thinking processes while the de-biasing approach engages System 2 processes. The 
implication is that better decisions can be achieved by engineering choice contexts: engaging 
a bias in order to overcome a more damaging bias.  
 This new way of thinking has its roots in the seminal book “Nudge”7 and is based on 
the premise that decisions are often easier to change when we “go with the grain” of human 
nature.8 The same errors that cause us to stumble can also be used to help us make better 
choices. Grounded in the latest findings in the behavioral sciences,1,7-10 the Mindspace 
framework has demonstrated its effectiveness in public policy contexts across numerous 
domains, including health, finance, and climate change. 
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 In this paper, we argue that the Mindspace framework can also be fruitfully 
introduced and extended to strategy, because some of the most important challenges in 
competing, organizing, and collaborating effectively are behavioral.11 After a brief 
introduction of the nine contextual forces that form the cornerstones of the framework, we 
introduce two real life cases to illustrate how Mindspace has been applied in strategic 
settings: in the first case Mindspace was used to improve implementation of a formulated 
strategy, while in the second case it was used to improve strategy formulation. Next, we 
outline some tentative applications of the Mindspace framework to a wide spectrum of 
strategic activities, including M&A, hiring decisions and organizational design. We hope that 
our paper will serve as a stepping stone and inspire Strategy researchers and practitioners to 
provide more theoretical as well as empirical support for the idea that strategists can improve 
decisions by working with, rather than against, managers’ intuition.    
 
Mindspace: Using One “Bias” to Overcome Another “Bias” 
Changing the Mind versus Changing the Context  
 Changing the mind of the decision maker, or de-biasing, has been the primary 
approach to improving decisions for decades. Recent research suggests, though, that de-
biasing is insufficient because it only deals with our slow, deliberate, conscious thought-
processes – our System 2 thinking. Yet our fast, automatic, unconscious decision making 
system – System 1 thinking – is often as crucial.12 Rapid System 1 processes provide the lens 
through which we understand the strategic problem (e.g., cooperating with a friend, 
responding to the threats of a potential enemy); focus our attention (e.g., which risks, which 
opportunities?) and generate the “gut intuitions” that rule out some options and push others to 
the top of the queue. Fast System 1 processing lays the groundwork on which slow, conscious 
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System 2 analysis can take place. If System 1 processing misleads us, we are more likely to 
make a flawed strategic choice, even before conscious deliberation begins.  
 Importantly, System 2 thinking often fails to correct for the problems that result from 
System 1 thinking because decision-makers are unaware of how System 1 influences their 
decisions and actions. For example, studies have found that factors that should be irrelevant 
from a rational perspective (such as the weather being sunny or cloudy) can significantly 
influence the decisions made (such as which applicants receive job offers).13,14 Similarly, in a 
legal context, the time of day (and hence whether judges are hungry or tired) can dramatically 
affect the probability of conviction or acquittal.15 Managers facing critical strategic decisions 
are likely to be similarly influenced by factors outside of their awareness. The unconscious 
nature of these influences makes them harder to combat. 
Even when the decision-makers do recognize these processes, they do not sufficiently 
adjust their System 2 processing.1 For example, consider how optimism can bias our 
tendency to believe that projects, whether in daily life, business or government, will be 
completed more quickly and cheaply than turns out to be the case.16 One prominent de-
biasing approach in forecasting is to encourage people to take an “outside view” – putting 
more weight on the statistics of a suitable reference class than on their own estimate of the 
specific case to be evaluated.17 For example, when judging the likely success of a product 
launch, outsourcing deal or merger, we should ask: “how often do new products in this sector 
usually succeed?”, “what is the typical fate of mergers?,” or “how frequently do outsourcing 
deals of this specific type turn out to be profitable?”. Yet research on optimism bias shows 
that even when informed of relevant and reliable statistics, people still do not fully correct 
their tendency to overestimate desirable outcomes (and their tendency to underestimate the 
undesirable ones).18 Thus, strategies can be suboptimal even after steps are taken to de-bias 
managers’ decisions.  
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 Note that we are not arguing that all System 1 thinking leads to biases and 
inaccuracies. Some cognitive shortcuts do not sacrifice accuracy for speed because they 
exploit environmental regularities.19,20 Some System 1 thinking processes are fast and frugal 
heuristics that have even been argued to be “better than rational”21 in particular contexts, thus 
exemplifying “ecological rationality”.19 In general, we can trust our System 1 intuitions when 
they have developed in a stable environment with reliable feedback.1,22 In contrast, our 
intuitions are likely to lead us astray in many strategic contexts that are unpredictable, noisy 
and are influenced by many interacting factors. In such settings, feedback is unreliable and 
experience can be misleading.23 Our focus is on the challenge of improving strategic 
decisions when System 1 thinking is predictably flawed.9    
 For all of the reasons above, de-biasing techniques by changing minds do not 
necessarily work. This paper introduces strategists to an alternative framework for managing 
the System 1 biases by changing the contexts – the “Mindspace’ framework. This framework 
was first introduced by Dolan et al., (2012)5 to help policy makers address policy challenges 
across many domains, including health, finance, and climate change. This framework has 
attracted substantial attention, particularly after both the UK and US governments adopted 
Mindspace and other closely related approaches (such as nudges).24 Many have argued that 
the adoption of such approaches has saved millions of dollars, thousands of lives, and has 
effectively addressed sustainability issues such as energy savings.1,7,8 
 The Mindspace framework is a list of nine important influences on System 1, which 
arise from closely related brain and psychological processes (for a description of brain 
structures and review of the evidence, see Vlaev and Dolan 2015; Vlaev et al., 2016).6,25 In 
particular, the nine Mindspace components can be distinguished by two separate mechanisms 
for automatic behavioral control: the impulsive mechanism and the habit mechanism. The 
impulsive mechanism connects specific stimuli (e.g., food, money, social ties) to 
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evolutionarily acquired psychological processes (e.g., belonging, attraction, comfort, disgust, 
fear, nurture, status, self-worth, trusting) and trigger innate automatic behaviors broadly 
described as “approach” and “avoidance.” On the other hand, the habit mechanism is 
developed through processes of reinforcement learning (i.e., actions that are associated with 
rewards are repeated whereas those associated with punishments are avoided), depending on 
the specific environment an actor is in. The literature supports the assumption that the habit 
mechanism generates motor habits - motor programs or behavioral schemata that have been 
frequently executed in connection with contextual cues as well as mental habits such as 
heuristics (see this endnote26 for more details). Table 1 provides a summary of the Mindspace 
framework and the specific psychological processes that generate each of the nine Mindspace 
components. The Mindspace components, by themselves, are neutral and do not necessarily 
lead to biases or problems. In fact, many of them are hardwired into our cognition because 
they are likely to be good strategies that exploit the recurrent evolutionary challenges our 
ancestors faced.19 Mindspace recognizes the importance of these drivers of behavior and 
makes use of them to influence behavior. 
[insert Table 1 about here] 
 For example, our craving for fat and sugar makes evolutionary sense in an 
environment where food is often scarce, but contributes to obesity today in societies where 
food is plentiful. The traditional solution to the public health problem caused by obesity is to 
resort to our System 2 thinking – through health education or improved nutrition labeling. 
Such techniques may change attitudes and knowledge, but research has shown that they do 
not have lasting effects on what people’s eating behavior.7 As documented in “Nudge”,7 
resorting to System 1 thinking to change the context has been shown to be a more effective 
way of inducing behavioral changes. In one experiment, a school cafeteria was able to 
increase students’ milk consumption, while decreasing the fat and sugar consumption, simply 
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by making low fat milk more Salient, i.e., putting milk on the front shelf while leaving the 
sugary drinks on the higher shelves or at the back. This example illustrates how one  “good” 
System 1 process is engaged to combat another “bad” System 1 process (of course, “good” 
and “bad” here are defined purely in the specific context, here of reducing obesity). 
 We believe that the Mindspace framework has important implications for strategists 
because some of the most important challenges in competing, organizing, and collaborating 
effectively are behavioral.11 Mindspace offers a novel, evidence-based tool for addressing 
these challenges. Below we first offer an overview of the nine interventions in Mindspace, 
before discussing the application of Mindspace in strategic contexts.  
Messengers  
 A well-known behavioral tendency is the influence of those who communicate a 
message: the same message can be interpreted differently depending on who sends it. We 
give more weight to information that is communicated by credible people: those who are 
perceived to have greater authority, expertise, to be more prestigious or have higher status, or 
those who seem to be similar or somehow connected to us. Once a messenger’s credibility is 
confirmed, we often comply with whatever they communicate unthinkingly, even when the 
messages sent are mistaken, foolish or immoral.27,28  
 Messengers who are perceived to be credible may indeed have better insight or access 
to useful information and paying attention to them is often entirely appropriate. Problems 
arise when the credibility of the messenger is misplaced. For example, people usually rely on 
experts’ predictions, yet these experts often predict quite poorly in several important areas, 
such as election results;29 future stock prices;30 or whether a technology will become the next 
“big thing”.31 The messenger effect is maladaptive when the accuracy of experts’ messages is 
decoupled from the apparent credibility of their messenger status.  
 8 
 Managers can rely on this Messenger effect to induce behavioral change. People may 
be skeptical of an alternative because they do not trust the people promoting it, for example, 
farmers in developing countries can be concerned that micro-financing schemes seem “too 
good to be true,” suspecting that their promoters have a hidden agenda.32 To encourage 
adoption, the promoters ask early adopters to help convince other farmers who are more like 
them, rather than targeting farmers who need financing the most. Adoption increases as a 
result because people are more likely to trust people who are similar to them.32  
Incentives 
 Our responses to incentives are characterized by predictable mental shortcuts. For 
example, we often evaluate alternatives on how their outcomes compare to certain reference 
points (which might be the status quo or, alternatively, what we expected to happen), rather 
than absolute terms. In addition, losses (outcomes which are below reference points) loom 
larger than gains (outcomes above reference points). The resulting loss aversion (and also 
risk aversion) can explain many behaviors that deviate from the principles of rationality.33 
Furthermore, people’s interpretation of incentives is also sensitive to contextual factors. For 
example, if a scenario of potential loss is more accessible in memory,34 or if this scenario is 
described in a more detailed fashion,35 loss is considered to be more probable and loss 
aversion is increased.  
Managers can use such behavioral reactions to incentives as a more effective means 
of steering behavior. Consider the challenge of generating truly new ideas in organizations. 
Most new ideas will cause disruption, as well as having benefits: and such disruptions are 
coded as losses when compared with the status quo. Thus, a new idea may be undervalued 
and avoided even when it is advantageous in the long run.36 Behavioral research suggests two 
ways in which strategists can engineer the context of decisions to reduce risk and novelty 
aversion: (a) reduce the frequency of evaluating the outcomes of new ideas; and (b) set the 
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rewards associated with gains to be at least twice as much as the penalty associated with 
losses.37 Both have been demonstrated to help evaluators to combat loss aversion.5    
Norms 
 We are strongly influenced by what others do, for instance, in our cultural preferences 
and in our technology adoption choices. Such social influences may result from informational 
conformity – following others’ behavior may be useful and less costly than our own trial and 
error learning in cases where we believe others have more experience and know better than 
we do.38 For example, we are more likely to try a new technology if many close friends have 
adopted it. In addition, there are powerful social forces which encourage us to conform: we 
do not want to be considered different or be singled out.28 For example, the classic Asch 
conformity experiment shows that people often conform to the majority opinion even when 
they know it’s wrong.28 Managers can induce positive behavioral changes by exploiting this 
tendency to conform. For example, hotel guests are more likely to reuse their towels when 
given the message “75 percent of the guests who stayed in this room had reused their towels” 
than when given the message “help save the environment”.39 Many people who want to “save 
the environment” do not reuse their towels because they can be either lazy or paying little 
attention. The application of Norm here effectively induces a change that is good for both the 
individual and the society.    
Defaults 
 We often “go with the flow” by defaulting to pre-set options and these Defaults can 
have a powerful impact on behavior even without necessarily restricting choice. For example, 
when the default is to automatically enroll employees in their pension plan, about three-
quarters tend to retain both the default contribution rate and the default asset allocation. Also, 
introducing a participation default can increase participation rates among new employees by 
more than 50%.40 Such powerful effects of defaults on behavior have been observed in a 
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wide range of settings including organ donation decisions, choice of car insurance plan, car 
option purchases, consent to receive e-mail marketing, employees’ contributions to health 
care flexible-spending accounts, and vaccination and HIV testing for patients and healthcare 
workers.41,42 
 Defaults are particularly important for inducing behavioral changes because people 
often default to no choice at all for some important decisions, such as enrollment in 
retirement and health care plans or organ donation. While an optimal option may be difficult 
to judge, the worst option may sometimes be no choice at all. Replacing the “no choice” 
default with an advantageous default option can improve the welfare of the decision-makers 
and society.41,42 The next section provides an introduction of how engineering defaults can 
help to improve strategy implementation.  
Salience 
 Our attention is drawn to what is novel and seems relevant to us, yet Salience does not 
always signal importance. For example, people were asked to estimate the year that the Taj 
Mahal was built after writing down the last three digits of their phone number, adding a 
preceding “1” to their 3 digits, and indicating if the resulting four-digit number was smaller 
or greater than their estimate of the year for the Taj Mahal’s construction. The results showed 
that the estimated years for the construction of the Taj Mahal were significantly higher if 
participants happened to have a higher four-digit number provided by their phone number 
plus the preceding “1”. A piece of information (in this case three digits from a phone number) 
without any logical connection to the estimation task nevertheless can work as an effective 
anchor when people have little knowledge about the task.3 Furthermore, despite clear 
experimental evidence to the contrary, people typically deny the influence of these salient, 
contextual factors in their decisions.14 For this reason, they cannot correct for the salient 
information because System 2 is not aware of how System 1 works.  
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 Managers can also exploit Salience to manage the attention of others. In the school 
cafeteria example we mentioned before, healthy drinks are chosen more (desired outcomes) 
when they are placed in the front shelves (i.e., made more Salient to the kids).  
Prime 
 We are influenced by thousands of sub-conscious cues each day. These Primes can be 
words (e.g., one feels more powerful and confident if being asked to describe an experience 
in which s/he has power over others); sights (e.g., larger food containers lead people to eat 
more); smells (e.g., the scent of an all-purpose cleaner makes people more likely to keep their 
table clean); or even weather (e.g., cloudy weather makes evaluators focus more on the hard 
evidence, such as candidates’ track records, than on soft evidence such as interviews). But we 
are not aware of how our preferences and decisions are shaped by these Primes. This 
suggests that many plans may not be implemented successfully because those who are 
implementing it can deviate from the plan due to irrelevant, unpredictable contextual stimuli. 
Our actions may seem unpredictable, and often non-rational, given that many everyday 
stimuli are random and unrelated to the decision at hand. 
 Knowledge about priming can help strategists influence others, or at least avoid being 
taken advantage of by others. For example, research shows that the color of the cover of 
business proposals can significantly and systematically influence evaluation outcomes,43 with 
blue enhancing acceptance rates while red reducing it. If you want others to think about 
something more analytically, it may help to present the question in more blurred or less easy-
to-read fonts because reduced reading fluency is associated with increased attention.44  
Affect 
 Our emotional associations can powerfully shape our decisions and actions. Emotion-
based decisions are not necessarily maladaptive. Many important tasks do not have attainable 
optimal solutions, and often a key question is when to stop searching for better solutions and 
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settle for a solution that is “good enough”.45 Emotions can work as a stopping rule for 
searching. For example, falling in love can be an effective stopping rule for searching for a 
soul mate – once a “good enough” partner appears, the emotions related to love kick in, 
thereby ending the search and strengthening commitment to the loved one. Note that purely 
cognitive stopping rules such as satisficing do not necessarily predict commitment. There is 
the danger that a “satisficer” will attempt to change partner as soon as a slightly more 
attractive one appears.  
 Emotions can also lead to problems arising from overreactions that can go on to affect 
others. For example, business cycles can occur, even without any significant changes in the 
economic fundamentals. Instead, the business cycles may be (over-)reactions triggered by the 
cascades of optimism (leading to the booms of the market) and fear (leading to the busts), and 
these emotions are further channeled by networks and reinforced by social influences.46 
Understanding and exploiting Emotion can help to combat other more damaging biases. For 
example, the practice of washing hands with soap after using toilets (or before eating) did not 
become popular in Ghana until a TV advertisement (based on a series of field experiments by 
behavioral scientists) provoked the emotion of disgust linked to not washing hands. Resorting 
to System 2 thinking, i.e., elaborating the benefit of using soap, was not useful in promoting 
this health behavior, but System 1 thinking, i.e., Affect, increased the use of soap by 41% 
through the motivation of avoiding the (negative) emotion of disgust.47  
Commitment 
 We seek to be consistent with our public promises, and we reciprocate beneficial acts 
by others. The Commitment effect is another lever with which to design the context of 
decisions for favorable outcomes. For instance, public commitment reduces procrastination 
by increasing the cost of failure (e.g., through reputational damage). Smokers who are 
publicly committed to quitting are more likely to succeed than those who commit privately.48 
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Importantly, a desirable behavior can persist long after the commitment-violation cost is 
gone, suggesting that public promises can be an effective short-term way to induce long-term 
behavioral changes.   
 The commitment effect has important implications for combating the problem of 
cooperation in contexts where each individual may benefit from acting selfishly (e.g., the 
prisoner’s dilemma, the tragedy of the commons), because we are hard-wired with a desire 
for fairness and reciprocity. Moreover, we are willing to punish unfair behaviors even when it 
is costly to do so and we feel compelled to reciprocate a good turn. This implies that publicly 
declaring goodwill to counterparty at the start of collaboration is likely to enhance the 
relationship. We will discuss in the next section how one can engineer with Commitment to 
attain other desired outcomes such as obtaining innovative ideas.  
Ego 
 We act in ways that make us feel better about ourselves. For example, we make self-
serving attributions in order to maintain a positive self-image, attributing our successes to our 
own ability and effort, but ascribing our failures to unforeseen circumstances, other people, 
and plain bad luck. This is particularly problematic when evaluating exceptional 
performances as exceptional successes tend to happen in exceptional circumstances. These 
outliers owe more to the situation and less to the people who happen to be in the right place 
and at the right time.49,50 People tend to attribute otherwise and those lucky executives with 
boosted egos can lead organizations astray, e.g., by being overconfident or taking excessive 
risk in subsequent decisions such as mergers and acquisitions.51  
 One approach to combat Ego is to engage in counterfactual thinking. Ask yourself: 
how likely is it that the success will happen even without your contribution? The answer is 
less important than asking the question itself. By considering how things could have 
happened differently, or could have happened without you, it is likely to attenuate the self-
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serving attribution biases. An example in practice is organizations engineering the context by 
including counterfactual questions in performance reviews. 
Changing the Mind or Changing the Context?  
 Mindspace, with its nine tools to induce behavioral changes by resorting to our 
System 1 thinking, offers a toolbox that is complementary to conventional approaches. While 
many examples we have discussed suggest that changing the context is more effective than 
changing the mind, we argue that the use of Mindspace framework does not preclude the use 
of other solutions. Effective “choice architects” do not, and should not, limit their behavioral 
intervention tools to Mindspace or nudges. In combating obesity, policy-makers have also 
incentivized the producers and distributors through subsidies and pro-rating taxes, which are 
conventional solutions aimed at changing minds. These measures indirectly “nudge” 
consumers because the healthy options are now cheaper and easier to obtain than unhealthy 
ones. As one of our co-authors testifies (who has acted as an advisor to the UK Behavioural 
Insights Team, popularly known as the “Nudge Unit”), actual policies are often a mix of 
influencing both System 1 and System 2 thinking, depending on the context and the field 
experimental results. Next, we introduce two real life cases to illustrate how Mindscape could 
work beyond public policy contexts.  
 
Case Illustrations 
 To what extent can Mindspace be extended to strategic contexts? The way Mindspace 
is used in the public sector suggests that it may be particularly useful for ensuring swift and 
effective implementation when desirable objectives and strategies are known. The challenge 
is to make changes happen. Below we first introduce a case of how an application of 
Mindspace, i.e., changing defaults, can improve the implementation of a formulated strategy 
and discuss implications for strategists. Next, we illustrate how Mindspace may be useful in 
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strategy formulation. We have highlighted the relevant and corresponding interventions in 
Mindspace in capitalized italics.   
Choose Less to Save More in Healthcare Organizations  
 Strategists and top executives in the field of Healthcare face a challenge: the 
trajectory of healthcare spending in many advanced economies may be unsustainable.52 
Healthcare expenditure is predicted to reach levels that will threaten the future financial 
sustainability of organizations and countries alike and will require trade-offs with other areas 
of public expenditure.53 In the US, recent estimates reveal that around one third of health care 
spending is due to unnecessary waste.54 Given these findings, a clear strategic goal for health 
care organizations is how to control total health care costs while improving, or at least 
maintaining, the quality of care.  
 Managers in health care organizations are aware of the scale of the challenge, but 
many of them still rely on traditional reforms which control either the demand side (e.g., 
introducing more paper work when receiving patients) or the supply side (e.g., cutting staff 
hours). These conventional approaches do not seem to be effective for achieving the strategic 
goal – their effects either do not last or are damaging to staff morale.55  
 One recent investigation suggests that a promising alternative is to reform an 
overlooked supply side process in healthcare organizations.55 While existing approaches to 
organizational reform assume that actors in healthcare systems will always behave 
rationally,56 new behavioral methods such as Mindspace pay closer attention to how people 
actually behave and the results suggest that health care staff, including doctors, do not always 
behave in a way consistent with the strategic goal of reducing resource waste.55 Below we 
introduce two examples of how using Defaults from the Mindspace framework, helps to 
effectively address this challenge.  
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 One clinical practice known to impact negatively on the sustainability of health 
services is doctors’ unwillingness to prescribe generic drugs, despite their cost-effectiveness. 
Most healthcare options have some kind of default, whether intended or not, and the choice 
of default will have a powerful effect on healthcare quality and outcomes. Default settings are 
often chosen on the basis of natural or historical order or convenience, rather than to increase 
the likelihood of beneficial strategic outcomes. Furthermore, changing defaults is often free 
or costs little. A recent field experiment reveals that changing defaults can induce changes in 
doctors’ behaviors and contribute to health care systems’ strategic goals.42 In this study, the 
default for two general internal medicine clinics based at the University of Pennsylvania were 
changed from the status quo (i.e., displaying both brand and generic medications) to a new 
system in which only generics are displayed with an option to opt out. Rather than issuing 
guidelines that could easily be ignored, the electronic prescribing systems were redesigned to 
ensure that generics are the default choice.57 At the same time, two family clinics operating 
within the same area continued to use the status quo prescription setting. This field 
experiment covered three medications: β-blockers, statins, and proton-pump inhibitors. The 
internal medicine providers significantly increased generic drug prescribing compared with 
the family medicine providers for all three medications combined and this case demonstrates 
how the use of default options can reduce waste and improve the value of patient care.  
 Another study conducted in Chicago reported dramatic improvements in an intensive 
care setting when a default was set to make daily breaks in sedation (interruption of sedative-
drug infusions) automatic for patients receiving mechanical ventilation, unless otherwise 
indicated by a physician.58 Such breaks allow neurological examinations and tests to assess 
alterations in mental status, which, if performed regularly, may accelerate recovery, while 
continuous infusions of sedative drugs is likely to impede efforts to perform such 
examinations. As a result of this new default setting, the median duration of mechanical 
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ventilation was 4.9 days in the intervention group, as compared with 7.3 days in the control 
group, and the median length of stay in the intensive care unit was 6.4 days as compared with 
9.9 days, respectively. Given the high costs of caring for critically ill patients, it is 
immediately apparent how this low cost intervention has significantly reduced the cost of 
care, both directly (including costs of hospital stay and sedative drugs) and indirectly, 
through costs related to complications of mechanical ventilation (such as ventilator-
associated pneumonia and barotrauma). This case shows how changing defaults can not only 
save lives, but can also make healthcare more economically sustainable. 
Discussion. The two healthcare cases discussed above illustrate how changing defaults 
motivates people to behave in a way consistent with the strategic goal of reducing resource 
waste. These examples also highlight how Mindspace can improve strategy implementation 
given a formulated strategic goal. A problem was diagnosed in the health care context: too 
much waste that damaged the sustainability of the system. A strategic goal was formulated to 
reduce cost while maintaining at least the same level of quality, but the question remained as 
to how to best execute this strategic goal and induce behavioral change. After running several 
sets of field experiments, managers applied changing the Defaults from the Mindspace 
framework to reflect best practice.  
 Note that even in this case where the right decision seems to be uncontroversial, it is 
difficult to induce behavioral changes before Mindspace is utilized. The “default” way to 
execute the strategic goal was not applying Mindspace, but traditional approaches such as 
cutting staff hours. Field experiments were conducted and demonstrated the effectiveness of 
the unconventional approach, i.e., by changing the context. The experimental evidence then 
helped to overcome the old “default” of applying traditional approaches.  
 This case also illustrates how a technology (i.e., electronic prescribing systems) can 
help implement Mindspace, and to “nudge” doctors successfully. A related example is 
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“Captology”, a platform developed by Stanford Persuasive Technology Lab, to motivate, 
enable and trigger people to do things differently. The application of Captology is consistent 
with Mindspace - a choice architect needs to understand the context, including actors’ 
motivation, ability and behavioural triggers, to maximize the changes in behaviours. 
Integrating technology to facilitate the changes is a promising route for strategists to 
consider, as our case illustrates. 
 How could changing defaults help strategists in non-healthcare related industries? 
One important challenge in organizations is resource allocation to ensure sufficient 
exploration of novel alternatives. Firms are likely to underinvest for the future if they default 
to directing resources towards existing activities and away from exploring new and 
potentially more profitable activities: in short, the default is to continue to exploit, even when 
it would be better to explore instead.59 The question is: how to induce behavioral changes to 
ensure a healthy level of explorations?   
 A successful policy nudge scheme, Save More Tomorrow,60 may provide inspiration 
for strategists in addressing the challenge of balancing exploration and exploitation. The 
scheme designs a default in which employees pre-commit to higher future contributions after 
receiving a pay rise and this default option will remain in place unless the employees opt out. 
This is an effective nudge, indeed one of the most successful policy nudges,7 because a 
common default is not to change the saving level, which will likely lead to under-saving for 
retirement. In addition, the scheme sets the growth of the contribution after pay rise to be 
smaller than the growth of the income and the change is likely unnoticed because the 
employees’ take-home income is not reduced (which combats loss aversion). 
 In a similar vein, firms can implement an Invest More Tomorrow scheme that sets a 
default of reinvesting a pre-set percentage of the profit generated from the existing options in 
novel alternatives. Take for example 3M’s “15% time,” a program that allows employees to 
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use a portion of their paid time to pursue their own projects. Successful implementation of 
such schemes requires that the purpose of these defaults be well communicated — and the 
scheme may be more readily accepted if the rate of investment ramps up slowly over time. If 
the reinvestment is not paced in this way, people can challenge the motives of setting these 
defaults because their losses may be immediate (e.g., managers in charge of existing projects 
have less resources to reinvest), while their benefits are ambiguous and in the future  (e.g., 
there is no guaranteed gains for the investment for novel projects).  
  In sum, these cases of changing defaults illustrate how Mindspace can be useful for 
the implementation of a clearly formulated strategy (e.g., to reduce waste). In practice, it can 
be difficult to distinguish between strategy implementation and formulation, with both being 
necessary parts of an iterative learning process in which feedback from testing and trial 
implementation is used to inform and update the formulated strategies. Strategists need to 
implement a formulated strategy to learn how effective a new option is in particular contexts. 
Furthermore, if the implementation is effective, it is relatively straightforward to attribute the 
outcome to the formulated strategy. In contrast, if the implementation is flawed and results in 
failure, it is not immediately clear whether the outcome is attributable to the formulated 
strategy or its flawed implementation. In this sense, improved implementation made possible 
by Mindspace can enhance learning.61 As the examples illustrate, the effectiveness of the 
Mindspace application was not obvious from the outset and it was only when early results 
demonstrated that Mindspace was superior to the status quo did strategists adopt the 
Mindspace approach.  
Innovate More by Searching Less in Venture Capital  
 A common challenge to strategists in venture capital is to identify the next big thing: 
which product is going to be the most popular; which technology is going to dominate; which 
start-up is going to have the first breakthrough. How to make smart bets on these high-risk, 
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high-return alternatives is crucially important yet is fraught with the potential for suboptimal 
bets. For example, we prefer to interact with people that are similar to us. We understand 
them better, interact with them more frequently, and like them better. This natural tendency is 
sometimes called homophily – birds of a feature flock together.62 People outside of one’s 
cliques are likely to be dissimilar to us and are thus more likely to be misunderstood and/or 
disliked. Homophily bias implies that some technologies or firms can be overvalued/ 
undervalued if they are/are not within the evaluator’s clique.   
 Overcoming the homophily bias is therefore a crucial challenge for venture capitalists 
whose job is to identify big hits, or disruptive innovations. These ideas are likely to come 
from people who are more peripheral in the network,63 and be ignored by incumbents or 
those central in the network biased by homophily. Identifying these peripheral players with 
truly undervalued ideas can promise huge returns for those who can effectively strategize and 
overcome the homophily bias.  
 These successful venture capitalists are the “brokers” in social networks.64 They 
channel and recombine the information from multiple cliques that otherwise would not have 
been in contact and play a crucial role in realizing the potential of these opportunities. The 
question is whether and how their valuable social network positions can successfully be 
sought ex ante. After all, many of these brokers are graduates of elite schools like Stanford 
and have superior connections due to their family background. The “broker positions” that 
enable them to overcome the homophily bias cannot be easily replicated. How can one 
overcome the homophily bias without simply happening to be in the right place at the right 
time?   
 Draper Fisher Jurvetson (DFJ), a US venture capital firm, offers an example of how to 
engineer the context to attenuate the homophily bias and thereby increase the likelihood of 
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identifying the next big thing.65 Their strategy, which has led to high-profile successes such 
as Hotmail, Baidu, Skype and Twitter, has two unconventional features.  
 First, instead of “searching for a needle in a hay stack”, DFJ engineers the context in 
order to attract ideas. To overcome homophily they aim to maximize their exposure to 
different ideas and people. Here is what DFJ did: once a promising field emerges (such as 
nanotechnology in early 2000), DFJ publicizes themselves as a leading investor in this field 
through high-profile activities such as extensive blogging, media appearances and speaker 
engagements. That is, instead of de-biasing its partners from homophily (i.e., seeking deals 
from similar others), DFJ goes with the grain of System 1 thinking by making itself a Salient 
and Committed investor in this emerging field with high uncertainty to attract attention. Note 
that this approach is the opposite to the conventional, secretive approach of most other 
venture capitalists. DFJ overcomes the homophily bias by opening up, exposing themselves 
to a large volume of business proposals from the widest possible range of sources, including 
those out of reach of even the most connected network brokers. As DFJ partner Steve 
Jurvetson put it: “We want to become a powerful magnet so the needles find us”. 
 Second, attracting a large volume of ideas poses challenges for evaluating them. The 
large volume of proposals firstly implies that the variance among them is likely to be high, 
which is actually good for DFJ because the goal is to get a few upside “home-runs” and 
exposing the firm to maximum variance is consistent with this goal. Note that this approach 
runs counter to our natural tendency to avoid not only losses but also uncertainty (Incentive). 
With a clearly defined and well-communicated goal, DFJ overcomes uncertainty aversion 
and embraces variance. The second implication of a large volume of proposals is that the 
average quality of the proposal is likely to be lower than that selected by the conventional, 
more focused approach. This means that DFJ has to filter out many more proposals in the 
early stage.  
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 To avoid falsely rejecting radical but promising proposals, DFJ applies two evaluation 
heuristics. The first heuristic is that DFJ tries to learn from the large volume of proposals, 
believing that a technology breakthrough is more likely to happen in an area where many 
people are working on the same thing. DFJ’s “magnet” approach enables them to hone in on 
more promising areas from the large volume of proposals they attract. While hiring many 
qualified evaluators to go through each submitted business proposal submitted is costly, this 
enhances the likelihood that DFJ identifies the next big trend and the eventual winning start-
up within the trend.  
 The second heuristic is that DFJ invests in a start-up as long as at least one partner 
feels very strongly about the idea and avoids unanimity in investment decisions. Importantly, 
since this heuristic combats three components of the Mindspace framework (namely, Norm, 
Affect and Ego, e.g., we feel happier when others agree with us), it is set as Default for all 
investment decisions in DFJ. Because it is very costly to implement the “magnet strategy” 
and the “learning from large volume strategy”, DFJ has to make sure they invest in the most 
radical ideas with potentially exceptional returns to justify the additional investment. By 
definition, radical ideas are against conventional wisdom and are likely to be discounted. If 
all partners agree on the potential of an idea, this idea is perhaps not radical enough. Research 
on group think66 also suggests that discussions and consensus among partners may also lead 
to more risk-averse decisions, inconsistent with DFJ’s goal. Moreover, competition will be 
more intense when commercializing such ideas because other venture capitalists may also see 
it coming. Instead of de-biasing their risk aversion and competition neglect using System 2 
techniques, DFJ partners resort to Default to engage their System 1 thinking. DFJ believes 
that “the basis for investment decisions is not compromise but strong beliefs by individual 
partners”.65 
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 To conclude, in order to beat the incumbent venture capitalists in Silicon Valley, DFJ 
plays a contrarian strategy. When others act as brokers and link elites from different cliques 
to enhance the average quality of business proposals, DFJ acts as a magnet to attract a large 
volume of ideas to generate the maximum variance. When others operate secretly to protect 
their connections and insights, DFJ opens up and learns of the next big trend using the 
wisdom of the crowd. When others make investment decisions based on consensus, DFJ 
agrees on the basis of disagreement.  
 Implementing a contrarian strategy is risky. DFJ offers an example of strategizing 
with biases. They know their evaluations are likely to be biased due to homophily, risk 
aversion and competitor neglect. Instead of attempting directly to de-bias their decisions, they 
engineered the decision contexts to engage the several effects of Mindspace that can 
overcome the known biases that can hurt their goal. 
Discussion. The DFJ case illustrates how a strategy in line with the Mindspace approach can 
not only benefit strategy implementation but can also be useful in managing more 
complicated strategic tasks such as search and innovation. This approach cannot guarantee 
that DFJ identifies the next “homerun” start-up, but it did help DFJ decrease the likelihood of 
betting on inferior options. More broadly, the Mindspace approach identifies the suboptimal 
decisions that can hurt both strategy implementation and formulation. Given the goal of DFJ, 
the suboptimal processes include our System 1 tendencies to imitate the most successful, to 
judge the more typical/similar more favorably, and to decide by consensus. By engaging 
other System 1 thinking forces, Mindspace helps to exclude the predictably suboptimal 
processes and enhances the chance that strategists can make a better decision.   
 DFJ’s atypical decision process which avoids consensus is effective given their goal 
in the context of venture capital. They focus on the extremes rather than average quality. A 
related case was presented in a recent article published in this journal.67 The game developer 
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Valve also “opened up” by hiring many atypical programmers to join their company; Valve 
implements a policy of “anything goes”, i.e., allowing programmers to devote 100% of their 
time to a project of their choice. Valve then “learned from the crowd” by setting up a rule of 
three: the company allocates further resources and support to a project if the project owner 
manages to convince at least two colleagues to join this project (and to give up their own). In 
contrast to DFJ, Valve values consensus in the form of social proof. One important difference 
between DFJ and Valve is their goals – Valve cares about the average quality of their 
products where DFJ only cares about the extremes. Another key difference is that Valve 
needs to channel substantial resources into creating a new game, whereas DFJ are more 
focused on “picking winners” among existing ideas. This explains their different ways of 
strategizing with consensus – it depends on the context and the goal.  
 The cases of DFJ and Valve suggest that the application of Mindspace can be 
integrated into the design of organizations. The strategies of “anything goes” in the case of 
Valve and “deciding against consensus” in the case of DFJ are consistent with the design of a 
polyarchy in which an alternative is approved as long as one of the members supports it (even 
when all other members oppose it).68 In both cases firms learn from the crowd: DFJ utilized 
volume in order to identify the next big trend, while Valve used social proof to identify and 
select projects of superior quality. These examples are also reminiscent of the well-known 
observation in organization theory that firms can increase exploration by introducing turnover 
and the ignorance of the newly hired may trigger learning by existing members that breaks 
the old equilibrium.59 Why rely on ignorant new members instead of increasing the rate of 
exploration by existing members? One reason is that it is very difficult to convince 
individuals to explore novel alternatives. Instead of “de-biasing” individuals (making them 
explore more), the environment is changed (by introducing turnover) in such a way that 
behavior is indirectly changed.  
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Applying Mindspace in Strategic Contexts 
 In the previous section, we illustrated how Mindspace has been applied in two real 
life cases. The first case focuses on improving strategy implementation by setting defaults, 
given a formulated strategic goal. The second case illustrates how Mindspace can help with 
more complicated strategic activities such as competition, search and innovation. We believe 
that the Mindspace framework can also positively contribute to a wide range of other 
strategic tasks. 
 Consider a key corporate level strategy to change the scope of a firm: mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A). Studies have estimated the failure rate of M&A to be between 70% and 
90%.69 Failure is partly the result of overpaying: the winning bid is likely to be higher than 
the actual value of the target firms, a type of “winner’s curse”.70 Higher bids are most likely 
to fail. The reason may be Ego: larger deals are often prompted by CEOs’ desire for greater 
power, status, and bonuses rather than rigorous evaluations of synergies.71   
How can bidding firms avoid making mistakes? Prior research has suggested ways in 
which executives involved in M&A deals can be de-biased,72 but Mindspace offers an 
alternative approach. For example, firms can pre-Commit to two Defaults for all M&A deals: 
(a) at least three similar deals that failed should be presented; (b) every manager has to 
present a “pre-mortem”73 by first imagining that the deal has failed and then working 
backward to determine what potentially could lead to the failure. These techniques can break 
groupthink (Norm) and remind people about the possible losses (Incentive) and attenuate the 
emotion associated with the fear of losing to competitors (Affect). 
 Consider strategic decision-making processes in typical business meetings more 
broadly. The Messenger effect suggests that companies should be careful not to overweight 
messages from people perceived to be more powerful and credible. To attenuate this bias, 
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firms can make the reports anonymous or ask the same person to present all of the reports in 
a meeting, thus forcing the receivers to focus on the quality of the message. People could also 
present the report of a randomly selected colleague, ideally without revealing its author. High 
status authors would be motivated to improve the quality of their reports because their 
content, rather than messenger, would now be crucial. Introducing some randomness in the 
decision-making process can thus enhance the quality of strategy-making because it can 
counteract our biases.50,51 More obviously, anonymous voting on business decisions would 
reduce the power of Norms, because people would feel more able to express their own 
opinion without violating the expectations of the group, or of particularly powerful 
individuals.  
 The application of Mindspace can also be useful in competitive contexts. One 
example is identifying undervalued resources (such as superior talent) in order to outperform 
competitors. The Salience effect is a particularly powerful bias that may reduce performance. 
For example, a stereotype such as “graduates from elite universities are superior employees” 
is a salient cue for identifying talented workers. But even if the salient cue is valid to some 
degree, highly talented people with other backgrounds will systematically be overlooked. 
This stereotype bias is self-reinforcing when the cue is widely applied because there will be 
fewer available samples to correct for the bias. This suggests that opportunities may exist for 
a firm that actively hires people who do not fit the stereotype.  
 For example, the elite law firms in the UK are over-represented by graduates from 
Oxbridge. One possible reason is that Oxbridge degrees are so salient that CVs with this cue 
are more likely to be considered further in the hiring processes. Nevertheless, if it is widely 
used across major law firms, this salient cue can become sub-optimal. There will be many 
graduates from other schools who may be better than some Oxbridge graduates but law firms 
cannot uncover these “false negatives” unless they hire people that do not fit the stereotype. 
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A leading law firm - Clifford Chance – has tried to address this problem. Clifford Chance 
adopted a “CV blind” policy to counter the Oxbridge recruitment bias. By engineering the 
hiring context this way, the firm has managed to find many “hidden gems” in the 
underexploited pool of graduates from non-elite universities that their competitors were not 
considering.  
 The example of hiring against stereotype also highlights an enduring challenge for 
strategists: a tension between Ego/Norms and the maximization of profit. To enhance one’s 
ego, one often has to conform to the existing Norms and to act in a similar way to others. This 
is likely, for example, to lead one being viewed positively by colleagues and stakeholders in 
the short term. Yet conformity with current Norms often reduces the likelihood of gaining 
competitive advantage, which requires thinking and acting differently, deviating from the 
Norms, doing something unexpected or even crazy in the eyes of the majority, being 
misunderstood even by close affiliates. In other words, competitive advantage is about 
winning big by doing something unconventional and going against the crowd.  
To overcome the power of Ego and Norms, one can change the social context by 
isolating oneself to reduce exposure to social pressure. The basic argument in favor of 
isolation was best articulated by the American geneticist Sewall Wright, who posited that 
species adapt slowly in a large connected community.74 Adaptation is more rapid when the 
species is divided into small subgroups (e.g., on neighboring but separated islands) with 
restricted interbreeding across groups. This isolation maintains genetic diversity and broadens 
the search for adaptive solutions. In product innovation, the idea of isolation has been applied 
to the design of R&D units into “ambidextrous” yet separate divisions that are governed by 
different rules, norms, and incentives. These units are often so-called “skunk works”, which 
are both geographically and culturally distinct from the larger organization to prevent the 
paradigms of the larger organization quashing the R&D division’s heterodox ideas.75 For 
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instance, the mythical “Apple Car” is said to be under development in a top-secret facility, 
minutes away from the Apple’s California headquarters. It is reported that employees 
involved in the project are asked to turn their official company badges around when entering 
the building so they will not be seen by members of the public. Creating and preserving such 
isolation may be strategically critical for harnessing thinking that is truly “outside of the box”. 
 As another example, consider strategic mistakes such as overcapacity and excess 
entry. In the fiber optic cable industry, firms have sustained large losses when failing to take 
into account the expansion plans of their competitors and as a result laid more cable than the 
industry demand can justify.76 Entrepreneurs similarly typically fail to realize that many 
others will enter.77 These mistakes are the result of competitor neglect, and research in the de-
biasing framework has suggested various remedies to avoid competitor neglect: from simply 
reminding managers to think about their competitors, to going through a checklist before 
making big decisions, to taking an outside view or playing war games.78    
Recent studies suggest, however, that such a de-biasing approach may not be effective 
because competitor neglect does not necessarily arise from managers’ lack of attention to 
competitors. Instead, the problem may result from an information asymmetry - managers 
have less information about competitors than about their own business.76,79 Since firms have 
less information about their competitors than about themselves, firms are likely to 
underestimate competitors’ opportunities and strengths, leading to an overestimation of their 
superiority relative to their competitors. This mechanism suggests why prompting managers 
to “first, consider the competition” is likely to be at best partially effective, because the 
problem is not managers neglect competition, but they misjudge the competition due to 
information asymmetry. 79  
 Can the Mindspace framework help to address competitor neglect in strategic 
contexts? We propose the following to engage System 1 thinking processes to make 
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information about competitors more Salient. For big strategic decisions such as whether to 
enter a new market, firms should set a Default by elaborating three scenarios in which a 
particular competitor could win against you and seven scenarios about how you could win 
against that competitor. The exercise of constructing detailed scenarios is consistent with 
prior work on de-biasing competitor neglect78 – it forces managers to put themselves in the 
shoes of their competitors. The Salience of the competitors decreases the information 
asymmetry between firms and their competitors and attenuates potential overestimation of 
their own firm. Moreover, our approach uses research on Priming to trigger a subconscious 
process that may complement the de-biasing approach: being asked to generate more reasons 
for a viewpoint can often make it less convincing.80 Specifically, we ask for fewer scenarios 
in which competitors win because coming up with a few scenarios is easy, whereas coming 
up with many is more difficult and time consuming. Based on past research, we expect that 
after such an exercise a manager is likely to think: “I easily came up with three scenarios in 
which my competitors won, and probably there are lots more – perhaps they are better than I 
thought. But I struggled to come up with seven scenarios when I won, and some of those 
were pretty implausible – so perhaps I am not as good as I thought.” A combination of the de-
biasing approach with the Priming effect may attenuate competitor neglect and the “better 
than average” bias.  
 In addition, strategists could employ the Incentives effects in the following way: (a) 
stressing (framing) the potential losses from overcapacity thus triggering loss-aversion; (b) 
asking strategists to estimate the odds for overcapacity, which should trigger overweighting 
small probabilities especially if the estimated odds is small; (c) present the immediate losses 
(and corresponding odds) which should feel exceptionally aversive due to present bias, while 
the long term gains will be discounted; (d) mental accounting could also be used to 
discourage overcapacity by creating separate budgets for small short-term (“venture”) and 
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large long-term (“expansion”) entry. Spending from the latter is unlikely because the 
accounts are largely non-fungible and marginal propensity to spend out of each account is 
different; (e) Ego can also be involved by asking managers to bet, using real money, on 
which competitors is likely to win. By being forced to bet their own money, managers are 
likely to consider more objective reasons whether their choice is a wise one.  
 In sum, Mindspace can help improve strategic decisions in at least three ways. First, 
Mindspace can improve implementation given a formulated strategy. A well-formulated 
strategy can fail because its implementations are subject numerous biases. Our first case 
study on setting defaults illustrates how Mindspace can help to improve the implementation 
of a formulated strategy. Second, for more complicated strategic activities such as 
competition, search and innovation, Mindspace may not directly help to identify the “right” 
decision, but it can help to eliminate behaviorally naïve decisions. While an optimal decision 
is often context dependent and almost impossible to know before implementation, there are 
clearly suboptimal decisions - and Mindspace can help to exclude these. Our second case 
study illustrates how DFJ overcame biases such as homophily and risk aversion by 
employing several forces in the Mindspace framework. Third, Mindspace provides another 
option for alternative strategic thinking that can provide the necessary uniqueness required to 
differentiate from the competitors. This can help to outsmart the less informed competitors, 
which is critical in both competitive and corporate strategy. Mindspace can also be integrated 
into organizational design, to ensure that gains from better decisions are systematically 
captured.  
Nudge resistance? 
 The Mindspace approach is developed for policy makers and has been demonstrated 
to be effective for helping people to make better decisions in public policy contexts.5 
However, skeptics worry that this approach involves an unacceptable level of paternalism. 
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There is an on-going debate on this issue in the policy arena, which has important 
implications for implementing the Mindspace approach in strategic contexts. For example, 
managers may resist nudges as they are supposed to make decisions rather than to follow pre-
determined options; indeed, managers may act against the nudges if they are aware that their 
decision context is engineered. Moreover, if the “nudgees” feel that they are being exploited 
by the nudgers, the nudges (and subsequent interventions) are more likely to backfire. Trust 
may be destroyed and suspicion of future nudges will increase. Nudgers can instead gain trust 
through transparently communicating that: (a) the nudgees, as human beings, are likely to be 
fallible, make suboptimal decisions, and be influenced by System 1 forces; (b) suboptimal 
decisions hurt performances; (c) performance can improve if nudges are implemented. The 
more complicated the strategic activities Mindspace is applied to, the stronger the evidence 
must be in order to support the proposed nudges; (d) the effects of nudges will be subjected to 
ongoing evaluation and modifications to guard against potential negative effects.  
 
Conclusion 
 The Mindspace framework focuses on engineering the decision contexts to improve 
decisions and choices in order to provide better outcomes. We argue that strategists need to 
pay attention to both “cognitive limitations” and the “structures of the environment”, two 
blades of the same pair of scissors (following Herbert Simon’s analogy).81 While traditional 
de-biasing works on ‘cognitive limitations’, the Mindspace framework operates on the 
environment. Better decisions can be achieved by engineering the environment to engage a 
“good bias” to overcome a more damaging “bad bias”. This new framework does not offer 
easy solutions, since applying it requires strategists to have a profound understanding of the 
strategic and human context. Neither does it provide definitive, evidence-based prescriptions 
to strategists as its application to strategy is still in its infancy.  However, we believe that it 
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does offer a promising, alternative toolbox to address key strategic challenges associated with 
competition, search, and innovation. It is our hope that Strategy researchers and practitioners 
alike will be inspired to provide more theoretical as well as empirical support to the idea that 
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